27.10.2023
The Philippines countering China's South China Sea expansion
In recent months, there has been a discernible manifestation of China's resolve to substantiate its presence and exert influence within the South China Sea (SCS). The process of militarization in this maritime expanse, coupled with the vigorous enforcement of expansive territorial and maritime assertions, assumes a position of paramount significance in the priorities of the Beijing government. This emphasis arises from the strategic objective of establishing a geographic security buffer, which, in turn, serves to shield China against perceived security threats emanating from the United States and its regional allies.
China's assertive policy and its outcomes
China's recent actions have notably impacted the Southeast Asian nations involved in the SCS dispute, with the Philippines emerging as one of the most significantly affected parties. A conspicuous illustration of China's assertive stance is the release of the 'China Standard Map 2023 Edition', which prominently features a 10-dash line, emblematic of Beijing's expansive claims encompassing a substantial portion of the SCS.
The Philippines, in particular, has borne the brunt of China's assertive policies in this region, as evidenced by escalating encounters between the Philippine Navy and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on one side and the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Militia vessels on the other, especially within the disputed features. For instance, Chinese vessels have employed proxy warfare tactics such as water cannons and military-grade lasers to disrupt or deter Philippine patrols and resupply missions. A highly sensitive point of contention in bilateral relations lies in the operation of the Philippine outpost established on the wreck of the BRP Sierra Madre vessel, intentionally grounded near the Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 as a strategic move to fortify the Philippines' position in the SCS. The location and the infrastructural condition of this outpost necessitate consistent resupply missions for the troops manning the BRP Sierra Madre, which China has increasingly sought to impede. In this regard, China's actions are growing increasingly assertive and coercive, with a prime illustration being the recent events that transpired during the supply mission on October 22. The CCG and Maritime Militia vessels engaged in "dangerous maneuvers," resulting in a collision between CCG vessel 5203 and the Filipino-contracted civilian vessel Unaiza May 2, utilized by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for resupplying the BRP Sierra Madre. In the course of the same resupply operation, Chinese Maritime Militia vessel 00003 bumped into the port side of the Philippine Coast Guard vessel MRRV 4409. While the mission ultimately achieved its goals without any casualties, the direct confrontation between ships from both countries established a dangerous precedent that could potentially lead to uncontrolled escalation in the near future. In the meantime, this incident has exacerbated diplomatic frictions, leading to the Department of Foreign Affairs summoning the Chinese Ambassador, Huang Xilian, and lodging its 55th protest against China in the year 2023 alone.
Filipino fishermen, who depend on access to fishing grounds in disputed areas, also deal with China's coercive actions nearly on a daily basis. China enforces maritime blockades, fishing bans and even deploys floating barriers. Notably, in late September, the PCG had to intervene and remove a 300-meter-long barrier that had been placed by Chinese authorities.
The cumulative effect of China's policies in the SCS has precipitated a decline in the trust of Filipinos toward China. According to the most recent survey conducted by Oculum Research and Analytics, 51% expressed a lack of trust in China, while merely 20% conveyed trust. This indicates a discernible upsurge in concerns within Filipino society regarding China's conduct. For context, a Pulse Asia study in July 2022 revealed that 36% of respondents expressed concerns about Chinese policies in the region.
Countering Chinese gray zone activities
The pronounced scale of China's assertive and aggressive actions in the SCS, along with the prevailing favorable public sentiment in the Philippines, prompted the administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to adopt a policy that centers on safeguarding national sovereignty and maritime rights within the context of the SCS situation. Consequently, there has been a discernible augmentation in the resolve of the Manila government, in stark contrast to previous administrations that typically adhered to a more reactive, and at times, reserved posture towards China, driven by apprehensions of potential repercussions from Beijing.
Manila has consistently implemented a comprehensive strategy aimed at countering Chinese activities in the so-called "gray zone," which seeks to enhance influence in the SCS. In tandem with this, the Philippine government has intensified its ties with long-standing allies, notably the United States, while concurrently cultivating relations with other regional nations such as Australia and Japan. Particularly, significant progress has been made in solidifying relations with Tokyo, exemplified by efforts to expedite the conclusion of the Visiting Forces Agreement with Japan by the end of 2023, which mirrors similar agreements already in effect with the United States and Australia. The diversification of security cooperation partners is of substantial magnitude, as underscored by this year's iteration of the Sama-Sama maneuvers. These exercises represent the largest-ever assembly under this initiative, with participation not only from the armed forces of the aforementioned three nations but also representatives from the navies of Canada, Great Britain, France, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Furthermore, the Philippine government collaborates closely with international media outlets to disseminate visual documentation, including photos and videos, which capture the belligerent conduct of the CCG and Maritime Militia within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the SCS. Publicly exposing Beijing's expansionist policies serves multiple strategic objectives. Firstly, it diminishes the efficacy of gray zone activities by augmenting the risk of tarnishing China's international image. Secondly, it enhances the awareness of the Philippine public regarding China's coercive actions within the nation's EEZ, thereby diminishing public trust in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and legitimizing the decisive actions undertaken by Manila in the disputed areas. Thirdly, it fosters greater support for the 2016 arbitral tribunal award, as evidenced by the fact that since November 2022, sixteen states have transitioned from positively acknowledging the ruling to fully supporting it by issuing statements endorsing the ruling as legally binding. Lastly, it fosters the formation of a coalition of nations similarly affected by the actions of the Chinese government within the gray zone.
The South China Sea – a primary national interest of the Philippines
According to the Philippines' National Security Policy for 2023-2028 released in August of this year, the SCS has been designated as a "primary national interest." The policy underscores the strategic significance of protecting national sovereignty in the disputed waters, necessitating comprehensive cooperation among various government entities, including the PCG, Navy, Department of National Defense, Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Senate. However, the Philippine government acknowledges its limitations, both in terms of military and economic capabilities.
Historically, the modernization program of the Philippine Armed Forces has primarily focused on land forces due to threats posed by entities such as the Maoist guerrilla New People's Army and Muslim armed groups in the Mindanao region. Consequently, the needs of the Navy and Air Force were somewhat neglected, despite their critical roles in maritime security. This approach was also influenced by the significant reliance of Philippine decision-makers on the U.S. security umbrella in the event of external threats. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty provided security assurances in the case of a conventional armed conflict, but it left room for interpretation regarding actions below the threshold of war. These ambiguities have been exploited by Beijing through "gray zone" operations.
Furthermore, the Philippine government has been working to enhance its maritime domain awareness (MDA) and minimum deterrence capabilities, which could be utilized in response to assertive actions by China or in the event of a full-scale conflict, allowing sufficient time for the mobilization of U.S. military forces in the region.
In recent years, both the United States and the Philippines have introduced changes aimed at curbing the PRC's ability to consolidate its influence in the SCS. Washington has made it clear that any attack on Philippine ships or aircraft, whether civilian or military, in the SCS, would trigger the implementation of U.S. treaty obligations to Manila. The Philippines has also been placing greater emphasis on the modernization of its navy, including the acquisition of modern frigates from South Korea and the BrahMos cruise missile system.
Additionally, the Philippine government has made efforts to enhance its maritime domain awareness, with support from external partners. An example of this cooperation is the recent access to Canadian satellites, which enables more effective monitoring of maritime traffic in the waters of the Philippines' EEZ, especially vessels that operate with their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders turned off.
Nevertheless, the paramount challenge that persists is the Philippines' economic reliance on China, which Beijing could potentially exploit as a leverage tool in the event of a substantial deterioration in bilateral relations. Despite concerted efforts to diversify economic partnerships, China remains the Philippines' primary trading partner, encompassing both imports and exports. The intricacy of altering this dynamic is exacerbated by the elevated inflation rate prevalent in the Philippines, thus posing a significant obstacle to the exploration of alternative sources for importing goods at competitive prices. In light of these circumstances, Manila should extend its collaboration with countries such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, transitioning beyond security cooperation into the realm of economic collaboration. The negotiation of new trade agreements would serve to mitigate the Philippines' economic dependency on China, consequently affording Philippine policymakers greater latitude to exercise strategic flexibility in safeguarding their "primary national interest."
A long-term perspective - the second arbitration case?
Given that the process of modernizing the armed forces and expanding economic partnerships is inherently protracted, it is imperative for the Philippines to adopt a long-term perspective when addressing the SCS dispute. Recent developments indicate a manifestation of this long-term viewpoint, notably through ongoing research and legal analyses concerning the potential submission of the second case against China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. In late September, Solicitor General Menardo Guevarra revealed that the Philippines is contemplating the filing of a new complaint against China, primarily concerning environmental damage incurred at Iroquois Reef in the Spratly Islands, attributable to the actions of Chinese vessels. This complaint, however, has the capacity to encompass a broader array of incidents that impact the overall situation within the disputed SCS. The category of "other incidents" may encompass activities such as the issuance of a new map by the Chinese government featuring the "ten-dash line," the militarization of artificial islands, the use of lasers and water cannons, as well as dangerous vessel maneuvering at sea.
The new legal dispute with China introduces a set of associated risks and challenges, alongside potential benefits. The predominant risk pertains to the looming specter of Chinese reprisals, encompassing both economic repercussions and a heightened propensity for aggressive actions within the SCS. Among the challenges, financial costs are a noteworthy consideration, associated with the legal process itself on one hand, and the protracted duration of the proceedings on the other. According to VERA Files, the Philippine government has earmarked an estimated USD 7 million for legal fees incurred in engaging international lawyers who played a pivotal role in securing the favorable ruling against China in 2016. Furthermore, it is crucial to recognize that the previous arbitration process extended over a duration exceeding three years. In light of this previous experience, the optimal approach would involve commencing a new legal trial with sufficient lead time to ensure that a verdict can be rendered before the conclusion of Marcos Jr.'s presidential term, set to terminate on June 30, 2028. A salient concern pertains to the potential for a shift in foreign policy towards the PRC under the stewardship of a new administration, analogous to the situation in 2016 when Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency and adopted a dismissive stance toward the favorable ruling for the Philippines issued shortly after his assumption of office.
The initiation of new legal proceedings offers a range of potential advantages that could impact both the Philippines' standing on the global stage and the domestic situation within the country. Another formal complaint is poised to exert significant pressure on the Beijing government, thereby bolstering Manila's bargaining position. Consequently, the administration under Marcos Jr. could compel the Chinese authorities into making specific compromises, such as those related to natural resource exploration and access to fishing grounds. Even in the event of China's refusal to participate in these legal proceedings, the prospect of another unfavorable outcome and the attendant reputational loss on the international stage will likely compel Beijing's decision-makers to reevaluate their existing policy in the SCS, necessitating suitable adjustments. Furthermore, a second legal victory for the Philippines holds significant intrinsic value as it will serve as a compelling argument in the years ahead, constituting a pivotal component of the Philippines' long-term security strategy. The pursuit of legal action may also have the ancillary effect of augmenting the approval ratings of the current administration within the country. Recent polls conducted by Pulse Asia in September, have indicated a decline in support for Marcos Jr., dropping from 80% to 65%. This decline is attributed to the persistent increase of basic goods and services prices, coupled with relatively high inflation rates. Given the Filipinos' profound mistrust of China, stemming from its aggressive actions in the SCS, assertive measures by the Manila government against Beijing could potentially reinforce President Marcos' position in the nation.
Conclusion
China's escalating policy in the SCS, notably exemplified in the context of the Philippines in recent months, underscores the imperative for Manila to persist in its existing initiatives. These encompass the modernization of its Navy and Air Force, enhancing its MDA, and bolstering its minimum deterrence capabilities. In conjunction with deepening military alliances with regional partners, the Philippines should extend this collaborative framework to encompass the economic sector, with the aim of mitigating Beijing's leverage capabilities. The prevailing level of tension within the disputed regions of the SCS also underscores that the potential advantages associated with filing another complaint against China with the PCA outweigh the attendant risks. Nevertheless, the outcome of this endeavor will hinge on the specific aspects of Chinese activities that the case addresses and the timing of the submission of all requisite documents to initiate the legal process.
This article was originally published by the FACTS and can be found here.