26.06.2023
The 20th Shangri-La Dialogue, which was held in Singapore, was largely centered on the prevalent apprehension surrounding the Sino-American rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region. However, another significant event occurred on the sidelines of the meetings in Singapore — a historic quadrilateral meeting, marking the inaugural gathering of defense ministry representatives from the Philippines, the United States, Japan, and Australia. Can this year's Shangri-La Dialogue be perceived as a catalyst for the emergence of a new QUAD?
The initial formation of QUAD, which comprised the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, was a response to the far-reaching consequences of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. The collaborative efforts within the renewed framework gained momentum during the presidency of Donald Trump. However, it was his successor, Joe Biden, who played a pivotal role in fostering closer cooperation by convening the inaugural leaders' summit in March 2021. Subsequently, the QUAD format has assumed greater significance in the Indo-Pacific region, expanding its scope beyond traditional security concerns to encompass areas such as epidemiological cooperation, particularly in light of the coronavirus pandemic, as well as technological advancements, space exploration, infrastructural development, and global efforts to combat climate change. But the Russian incursion into Ukraine in February 2022 has led to deepening divisions within the format, primarily stemming from differing stances toward Moscow. This divergence of opinion, most notably exemplified by India's position, has further accentuated existing schisms within QUAD.
During the recent Shangri-la dialogue, an important meeting occurred on the sidelines, potentially marking the beginning of a new QUAD formula or QUAD 2.0 format. Noteworthy participants in this meeting included the US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, the Acting Defense Secretary of the Philippines, Carlito Galvez, Japan's Minister of Defense, Yasukazu Hamada, and the Australian Defense Minister, Richard Marles. The central focus of discussions among the meeting’s participants revolved around the proposition of conducting joint patrols in the South China Sea. Such an initiative would represent a significant step in the implementation of the American strategy of integrated deterrence, whose aim is to curtail China's burgeoning influence in the region and address the increasingly assertive actions exhibited by the Chinese military.
Just a few days prior to the security forum in Singapore, two incidents involving China and Western forces took place in the Southeast Asia region. The first incident transpired on May 26, when a Chinese J-16 fighter jet performed a hazardous maneuver in close proximity to a US RC-135 Rivet Joint (Boeing RC-135) reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea. The second incident unfolded in the Taiwan Strait during the routine transit of US and Canadian Navy units. On this occasion, a Chinese naval vessel crossed the course of the USS Chung-Hoon, forcing the American crew to abruptly reduce speed to avoid a collision.
Nevertheless, irrespective of recent events, it is important to acknowledge that the most significant beneficiary of enhanced cooperation within the quadrilateral format would be the Philippines. Given its limited military capabilities to deter Chinese activities in the so-called "grey zone", tighter collaboration among QUAD members would very much serve the Philippines' interests.
Despite the encouraging developments observed at the Shangri-La dialogue, it is important to recognize that we are merely witnessing the early stages of a particular process. In the context of the present iteration of the QUAD, it took ten years from the initial gathering of representatives from the United States, Australia, India, and Japan on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2007 for formal talks to be convened on an official level. Consequently, the statement made by Daniel Kritenbrink, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, and the Pacific, in May of this year, in which he dismissed the possibility of establishing a new QUAD format, should not be surprising. However, it is noteworthy that he did not categorically reject the prospect of expanding and strengthening cooperation with the Philippines, Japan, and Australia, thereby leaving room for maneuver and collaboration.
Apart from the formal framework, the practical dimension for cooperation assumes greater significance, as evidenced by tangible developments. An example of this was this year's iteration of the Balikatan maneuvers, which saw the largest military exercises in the initiative’s history. Notably, alongside Filipino and American troops, the Australian armed forces actively participated, with Japanese observers also in attendance. Moreover, the occurrence of the inaugural trilateral exercise involving the US, Philippines, and Japanese coast guards in early June further demonstrates this growing cooperation. Notably, the exercise was observed by representatives from Australia.
Based on these developments, it can be confidently asserted that all four nations are steadfast in their commitment to fostering cooperation and interoperability. This concerted effort is expected to culminate in the conducting of joint patrols in the South China Sea during the third quarter of 2023.
In contrast to the original QUAD format, in which India replaced the Philippines, the new initiative would encompass all US treaty allies. This composition lends support to the viability of the initiative in the long run. The significance placed by Washington on the development of an alternative version of the four-party security cooperation-oriented format is evident in the series of meetings held since December 2022. These meetings, conducted in the 2+2 format, involving representatives from the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, have included officials from Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. The keen interest displayed by American allies in exploring novel avenues of cooperation stems from their shared recognition of the threats posed by China's expansionist and assertive policies in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan.
Apart from the planned implementation of joint patrols in the South China Sea, the next step towards consolidating quadrilateral cooperation would be the conclusion of a visiting forces-style agreement between Manila and Japan. Similar agreements are already in effect between the Philippines, the United States, and Australia. The establishment of such formalities with Japan would facilitate an expansion in the scope and scale of joint military exercises involving the armed forces of the Philippines and Japan. Furthermore, it would serve as a foundation for fostering cooperation in other domains, including the augmentation of intelligence sharing.
The significance of expediting this process is duly acknowledged by the Philippines, the United States, and Japan, and was evident in its inclusion among the key topics discussed during the inaugural trilateral meeting between the National Security Advisors (NSAs) held in Tokyo on June 16, 2023. The three NSAs deliberated on frameworks aimed at enhancing and facilitating reciprocal visits of defense and military officials between Japan and the Philippines. Additionally, they explored opportunities for conducting maritime activities, including multilateral joint naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific region. This issue is of particular importance for the government in Manila, as it grapples with China's assertive behavior in the disputed areas of the South China Sea.
Considering the challenges ASEAN faces in organizing such initiatives, the Philippines finds the prospect of increased exercises in the South China Sea with the United States and its allies particularly appealing. During the 20th ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Meeting (ACDFM 20) on June 7, Admiral Yudo Margono, Indonesia's military chief, announced ASEAN's inaugural joint military exercise in the South China Sea, which is scheduled for September this year. It is important to note that Indonesia emphasized the exclusion of combat operations training, with a focus instead on non-traditional security matters, humanitarian operations, and disaster relief efforts. However, a few days following the ACDFM 20, General Vong Pisen, the commander-in-chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, issued a statement indicating that Cambodia has yet to reach an agreement regarding participation in the drills. Cambodia's reservations can be interpreted as an attempt to undermine Indonesia's plan, potentially reflecting a pro-Chinese stance, given Cambodia's perception as Beijing's primary regional partner among ASEAN member states. In the end, Indonesia succumbed to the applied pressure and objections raised by Cambodia, as demonstrated by the statement issued by the Indonesian military on June 20. The statement announced a change in the location of the planned exercises, shifting from the North Natuna Sea (a portion of the South China Sea encompassed by China's nine-dash line) to the South Natuna Sea, thus avoiding disputed waters. Parties which are involved in the South China Sea dispute and exposed to China's coercive actions, bear the brunt of the Indonesian compromise, which can embolden China to continue its belligerent activity in the region. As one of the affected nations, the Philippines faces the need to seek non-ASEAN partners to garner support in curbing Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. This need is due to ASEAN's consensus-based decision-making process as well as Beijing's substantial influence in certain Southeast Asian countries.
In conclusion, the formal establishment of the new QUAD version is unlikely to take place in the next few years. Nevertheless, the driving factor that will influence this process significantly is the activities undertaken by China in the Indo-Pacific region. From the perspective of the Philippines, forging security cooperation with countries other than the United States has substantial benefits. This approach enables Manila to maintain a greater level of independence from Washington's influence, ensuring that it is not solely reliant on the United States as its security guarantor. Consequently, the Philippine government will gain additional options to withstand American pressure, particularly during times of heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
Currently, both parties agree to utilize Philippine military facilities under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) for defensive purposes only. However, the United States' position on this matter may rapidly change in response to Beijing's actions. The diversification of security partners also has advantages for some in the Philippine domestic political arena. Notably, some vocal political factions oppose deepening security cooperation with the United States, as they argue that such a stance perpetuates a neo-colonial relationship that excessively relies on American support. The increased involvement of Japan and Australia in the Philippines' security architecture should help to assuage the concerns of skeptical groups regarding Washington's role. Additionally, it serves as a compelling argument in support of the independent foreign policy pursued by the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration. Importantly, by implementing this strategy, Manila avoids being unequivocally aligned with the American sphere of influence. By cooperating with multiple countries, the Philippine government mitigates the risks associated with potential Chinese repercussions, which would be more pronounced if it explicitly sided with the United States. Moreover, maintaining a prudent distance in its relations with Washington allows for continued dialogue with Beijing, which is of great significance given China's status as the Philippines' largest trading partner.
Last but not least, recent developments surrounding the ASEAN joint naval exercises scheduled for September in the South China Sea further underline the rationale for cultivating security cooperation with non-ASEAN states that are less susceptible to Chinese pressure and influence.