22.04.2024
As we are all aware, the Indian Ocean, offering strategic maritime routes and numerous economic opportunities, has long been a focal point for regional power dynamics. Recent events in the Maldives show President Muizzu’s pivot towards Beijing has become popular, marking the historic parliamentary election victory for the People’s National Congress (PNC) over the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP). A strategically located archipelagic state highlights the complexity of diplomatic relations, military cooperation, economic agreements, and unresolved claims in international politics. This forms the basis for the intricate relations between the Maldives, China, and India. In light of the years ahead after the elections in the Maldives, this commentary addresses the following questions: why did President Mohamed Muizzu break with unwritten tradition and opt out of his first formal visit to India in favour of Turkey followed by visit in China? Moreover, how does the strategic partnership between China and the Maldives affect Sino-Indian relations and possibly broaden Indo-Pacific strategies?
Maldives’ strategic location and its implications for China and India
As Chinese diplomacy continues its efforts to keep its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project attractive to developing world countries, it seeks to improve regional connectivity to enhance its global outreach. In this context, the strategic importance of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for the BRI’s further expansion is of the highest importance. Infrastructure links between Western parts of China and the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan are a strategic asset for China to secure a trade route that bypasses the Strait of Malacca, a critical choke point currently dominated by potential rival powers. The extension of CPEC into maritime routes in the Indian Ocean enhances this strategy, offering China a secured energy and trade route and a significant geopolitical foothold in a region crucial for global maritime trade dynamics. China's increasing dependence on imported oil, which is crucial for maintaining internal stability and fostering economic expansion, compelled the CCP to take all essential measures to safeguard its sea lines of communication (SLOC). The so-called „Malacca dilemma” was introduced in 2003 by PRC President Hu Jintao. It depicted the need to maintain and secure the open Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for undisrupted China’s growth. India views the CPEC and Beijing maritime extension with considerable suspicion and concern. The CPEC passes through regions India considers disputed territory, specifically Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which exacerbates sovereignty issues. From a broader perspective, India is wary of China’s growing influence in what it perceives as its strategic backyard - the IOR. This has prompted India to reassess its regional strategies, focusing on enhancing its maritime capabilities and strengthening regional and global alliances. India’s response includes bolstering its naval presence and capabilities in the Indian Ocean to ensure it remains a significant power in regional maritime security. Additionally, India is actively engaging in regional diplomacy to counterbalance China’s influence, strengthening ties with nations like the United States, Japan, and Australia through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD).
Maldives’ Diplomatic Engagement and Strategic Partnership with China
The state visit of Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu to China in January 2024 marked a multifaceted turning point in Maldivian-Chinese and Indo-Maldivian relations and the domestic politics of this island nation in the Indian Ocean. As a result of the visit, China and the Maldives elevated their relationship to a "comprehensive strategic partnership." This elevation of bilateral relations reflects China's growing ambitions and influence in the Indian Ocean region and their involvement in extending the Belt and Road Initiative in Asia. This strategic move also highlights the growing role of the Maldives in China’s "String of Pearls" strategy, aimed at increasing Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. This is primarily achieved through infrastructural investments, significantly affecting China’s development and, consequently, the control of maritime trade routes and the Chinese navy’s establishment of overseas naval bases. The outcomes of the Maldivian President's meeting with the Chairman of China were not positively received on the domestic political scene. The majority coalition in the Maldivian parliament, opposed to the president's actions, initiated impeachment proceedings against Mohamed Muizzu, sworn in November 2023. Among other reasons, the impeachment proceedings were initiated due to the perceived negative impact on relations with India - the Maldives' natural and, until now, most important ally. This is particularly sensitive for Malé, the capital of the archipelagic state, especially given its strategic location in the Indian Ocean region. Interestingly, the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), which gathered enough signatures for the impeachment motion, has not formally submitted the request against Muizzu. According to the Maldivian constitution, impeachment requires the support of two-thirds of the parliamentary votes, which seems relatively straightforward for the MDP and its allies to achieve. Internal party relations seem to be undergoing political negotiations to reach a consensus, allowing the controversial cabinet and President to survive. Undoubtedly, the role of China in this process should not be underestimated, although Chinese diplomats must be particularly cautious not to be accused of interfering in the Maldives' internal competencies. Notably, while not directly cited as a reason for impeachment, relations with China play a significant role in the country's political context. President Muizzu has been perceived from the beginning as a leader with a pro-Chinese stance, which currently significantly influences the dynamics of the Maldives' international relations, particularly with the aforementioned natural and longstanding strategic partner, India.
UN Channels for Bilateral Relations
Although the United Nations is a multilateral forum, Chinese diplomacy actively utilises this organisation for bilateral purposes. Importantly, China has also used the UN forum to address significant issues concerning the internal politics of the Maldives. Mohamed Muizzu, by initiating the "India out" policy, a key element of his presidential campaign resulting in the limitation of New Delhi's interference in domestic politics, effectively finalised a longstanding China demand repeatedly raised at the UN. For example, in 2018, China opposed any foreign intervention in the Maldives' internal affairs in the face of internal instability at the UN Security Council forum. At that time, the former President of the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, appealed to India to use its military to end the unrest. The UN then called on the then-President of the Maldives, Abdullah Yameen, to end the state of emergency in the country. This met with firm opposition from China, which was directly commented on by the then-spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geng Shuang. During a press briefing, he presented the position of the Chinese government that the "[conflict] should be properly resolved through dialogue and consultations between the relevant parties (...) and the international community should respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Maldives and play a constructive role in the dialogue between the interested parties." Furthermore, during the COVID-19 pandemic, China also utilised the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Maldives to "strengthen the state in its capacity for readiness, response, and recovery in connection with the pandemic." At that time, China was involved in the project "Triangular Cooperation Response to COVID-19 in the Asia and Pacific Region" (CHINA-UNDP Triangular Cooperation Response to COVID-19 in the Asia and Pacific Region), which enabled, among other things, the visit of Wang Yi to Malé in 2022 during the ongoing pandemic (which was not a common practice of China), where both parties committed, among other things, to maintaining "true multilateralism" and protecting the authority of the UN and the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter in the common interests of developing countries, which in diplomatic language meant the desire to coordinate international policies at the UN forum. In the second half of 2022, this also enabled a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Maldives and China on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.
Military Cooperation along the Malé-Beijing Axis
Looking more broadly at Sino-Maldivian relations, it is necessary to refer to the agreement on free military assistance, which finally came into force on March 5, 2024. This was a consequence of President Muizzu's demand to withdraw Indian military personnel from the islands. It is expected that the process of withdrawing more than 80 Indian army soldiers will be completed in the first half of May 2024. As previously mentioned, this represents a significant turn in the foreign policy of the Maldives, as defence and its alignment with defence alliances previously relied solely on close cooperation with New Delhi. This event signifies the strengthening of military and defence cooperation between China and the Maldives and raises questions about the future of Indo-Maldivian military and security relations. From media reports, the turn in Maldivian policy could be related to concerns about India's growing influence in domestic politics. This was associated with the assumption that India might soon undertake actions to establish an overseas military base on one of the Maldivian islands. In this context, it is vital to consider the position of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the Sino-Maldivian military agreement as "part of normal cooperation, which is not aimed at any third party and is not subject to any third-party interference." However, there is no doubt that the potential implications of the presence of Chinese military aid for regional security dynamics underscore the strategic competition between China and India in the Indian Ocean. Confirmation of this is India's decision to strengthen forces on "strategically important" islands near the Maldives, initiating the establishment of a military base on the island of Minicoy in the Indian archipelago of Lakshadweep, located 130 km north of the Maldives. The base is to start functioning even before the complete withdrawal of Indian military personnel from the Maldives. In the context of US engagement in the Indo-Pacific, the position of the US administration is also important. The spokesperson for the US State Department said that Washington "is monitoring" reports of the new agreement between the Maldives and China. Mathew Miller called the Maldives a "valued partner" with which the United States expects to develop cooperation.
The Essence of the Broader Context. Tense relations between Beijing and New Delhi
China's rapprochement with the Maldives, compromising India's regional interests, also fits into the broader context of tense bilateral relations between New Delhi and Beijing. Current relations between India and China remain particularly tense since their escalation in 2020, where a conventional clash between soldiers of both states occurred in the Himalayas. Currently, in bilateral relations, the leading issue concerning the disputed border was the pre-election visit of Narendra Modi to the region of Arunachal Pradesh, where the Prime Minister of India inaugurated the opening of the Sela tunnel project, one of the most significant infrastructure projects in the region. China issued a protest against the visit of the Prime Minister of India, claiming that such an approach "only complicates the border issue." The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman stated, "China has never recognised the so-called Arunachal Pradesh, which was illegally established by India and strongly opposes it." He also emphasised that India has no right to "arbitrarily develop the area of Zangnan (Southern Tibet) in China." Not surprisingly, India criticised the statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that "Indian leaders visit Arunachal Pradesh from time to time, just as they visit other states in India" and "opposing such visits or development projects in India does not make sense (...) what's more, it will not change the fact that the state of Arunachal Pradesh was, is, and will always be an integral and inalienable part of India." Meanwhile, US intelligence agencies expressed concern about a potential armed conflict between India and China "due to the escalation of tensions and the deployment of significant amounts of troops along the disputed border." Nearly 50,000 soldiers from each side are stationed in the disputed Ladakh sector, which could lead to "the risk of miscalculation and escalation." The concerns of US intelligence are not without probability, as three days later, China conducted tests using live ammunition on the border with India at the Karakorum mountain chain. "Newsweek" estimates that up to 150 to 200 thousand soldiers remain alert on both sides. In connection with these events, on March 20, 2024, the spokesperson of the US State Department, Vedant Patel, during a press briefing, clearly emphasised that "the USA recognises Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory." The next day, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, Lin Jian, strongly criticised US interference in the border dispute with India. Lin Jian also stated that "everyone knows that the USA consistently does not spare efforts to provoke and exploit the conflicts of other countries to serve its selfish geopolitical interests." It should be noted that Sino-Indian tensions reflect competition for influence and prestige on the international stage, especially in leadership over the states of the Global South and influence in the United Nations. Furthermore, the firm position of the USA, recognising Arunachal Pradesh as part of India, indicates a clear desire to support New Delhi in the Indo-Pacific region and concern about the geopolitical consequences of a potential conflict. At the same time, the presence of a large number of troops along the disputed border and military tests using live ammunition by China increase the risk of escalation and armed conflict. However, the conflict on the border under current conditions should not be expected to lead to an open conflict between the parties. Therefore, the issue of the Maldives remains extremely important for both sides at this time and has become a matter of prestige. As a Sino-Indian proxy, the Maldives can legitimise and indicate the side with greater diplomatic agency on the international stage.
Results of the 2024 Maldivian parliamentary elections. Strategic U-Turn in Maldivian politics
With the final results of the parliamentary elections, it has become evident that the political landscape in the Maldives is poised for substantial transformation. The former opposition, now led by President Muizzu and his Progressive National Congress (PNC), has garnered unprecedented public support. Securing 66 of the 93 parliamentary seats, the PNC is on track to consolidate near-absolute governance by 2029. This shift signals a steadfast continuity in the president's strategic stance, notably the diminishment of New Delhi's sway over Malé, underscored by the "India Out" initiative. More crucially, it heralds a pivot towards strengthening ties with Beijing - a strategic realignment that was reassured during the electoral campaign by awarding key infrastructure projects to Chinese state enterprises. Such manoeuvres unequivocally articulate the PNC's intent and forecast the trajectory of the Maldives' domestic and international policy orientations. Regarding domestic policy, recalibration towards Beijing could catalyse a new era of investment and infrastructure development financed and executed by Chinese firms, fostering economic growth and raising concerns over increased dependency and debt diplomacy. However, the PNC's significant victory has severe implications for regional geopolitics. Pivoting away from India could destabilise the delicate balance of power in the Indian Ocean, prompting New Delhi to reevaluate its strategic outreach and engagement with smaller island nations. It may also invite a response from other regional players, potentially escalating into a more pronounced power contest in South Asia. Additionally, the international community, mainly Western democracies, may express concerns over human rights and governance issues, which could affect the Maldives' foreign relations and aid. Lastly, but most importantly, this electoral outcome is a strategic message to global powers that the People's Republic of China is gaining its outreach and is ready to redefine ever-existing alliances and chart a new course in international relations. The success of President Muizzu's party illustrates the dynamic and shifting nature of international alliances, reflecting broader global trends towards multipolarity and regional realignments.
Happy end for the Chinese strategy towards the Maldives?
The positive conclusion of the recent parliamentary elections marks the final stage of the process of overtaking India as the most influential global power in Malè. The whole process accelerated in 2014, one year after the introduction of the BRI (then the One Belt One Road Initiative - OBOR). It was that time China opened their embassy in Maldives. Since then, we could have seen growing China’s influence over the archipelago. Under the administration of former President Abdulla Yameen, Xi Jinping visited Maldives in 2014, which resulted in Malè officially joining the OBOR. In 2017, both countries signed the first-ever Maldivian Free Trade Agreement, however it remains ineffective until now, but most likely, this will be a subject of change. In the mid-2010s, all of the significant public sector contracts were conducted by Chinese enterprises. Key infrastructure projects such as the Velana International Airport expansion and the construction of the Sinamale Bridge were executed by Chinese state-owned enterprises. However, the investment that consolidated the Sino-Maldivian relations was Huawei Marine Networks (HNM) 1,200-km submarine telecommunications cable, as part of the National Submarine Cable Project aimed at enhancing the ICT infrastructure of the Maldives. At the time of growing Western allegations towards Huawei Furthermore, this move should have been seen as a political statement, leading to further expansion of China’s influence over the Maldives. On top of that, in February 2020, HMN secured a contract to develop the Maldives-Sri Lanka Cable System, which is intended to boost digital connectivity between the two island nations. This consolidated the bilateral relations even further and showed the deteriorating relations between Malè and New Delhi.
Summary
In light of the recent dynamics in relations between China and the Maldives, Muizzu’s presidential win, followed by PNC’s parliamentary success, implicates severe consequences for the Indo-Pacific region. Based on the significant asymmetry, the bilateral relations are characterised by strengthening diplomatic ties, military cooperation, and economic agreements, reflecting the changing balance of power in the Indian Ocean. Although these changes directly concern the Maldives, offering potential economic growth and strategic partnership with the world's second-largest economy, they also challenge regional stability. As China and India compete for influence in this critical maritime area, the Maldives have become a key player whose further diplomatic trajectory and alliances may be decisive for the future dynamics of political and economic affairs in the Indian Ocean. This is extremely important for the Maldives' hitherto closest partner, India, as approximately 50% of India's exports and 80% of its energy raw material imports occur through this part of the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) concluded between Beijing and Malé in 2014 (which has not yet been implemented), and other infrastructure initiatives not only bring the Maldives closer to China economically but may also transform the archipelago into a strategic point on the map of Chinese influences in the Indian Ocean region. On the other hand, the development of these relations raises natural concerns about the indebtedness of the Maldives and the potential risk to their sovereignty and strategic balance in the region, where Sino-Lankan relations are a crucial example of such dependency in the region. Sino-Indian tensions in the context of the Maldives and the broader context of the Indian Ocean region reflect not only competition for influence in the region but also the pursuit of both states to play a dominant role as a superpower in the global context, with substantial implications for regional stability and international balance of power in the leadership of the group of Global South countries. It should be noted that China has made significant investments in diplomatic presence on most of the islands of the Indian Ocean. China is the only country from the group of so-called "traditional players," such as the United States, the United Kingdom, India, or France, that have embassies in each of the six island states - Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Comoros. In other words, China's relations with the Maldives will be crucial for the future stability of the Indian Ocean. This, in turn, further indicates China's willingness to group with the small island states, influencing the Indo-Pacific strategies of the other significant actors in the region.