29.03.2023
The Philippines is the oldest ally of the US in Asia, but the relationship between these countries has not always been plain sailing. The vast majority of Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016-2022) marked a period of decline in relations between the two allies. This falloff was illustrated by the then Philippines administration adopting a clientelistic attitude towards Beijing by seeking economic benefits and support of the country's infrastructural development against the backdrop of the two countries’ dispute in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the failure of the Chinese side to fulfill its financial declarations and the growing social unrest in the Philippines in connection with China’s expansionist policy in the South China Sea meant that President Duterte, despite his anti-American views, began the process of normalizing relations with Washington, thus laying the foundations for his successor in improving Philippine-American ties.
The Philippines pivot toward the United States
During his election campaign, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. represented a relatively balanced stance on the Sino-American rivalry in the region. He stressed that activating a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in the event of tensions in the South China Sea could lead to severe consequences for the Philippines. As a result, he promoted the idea of dialogue and continued involvement in relations with China in order to prevent an armed conflict in the region. Nevertheless, after Ferdinand Marcos Jr. assumed office at the end of June last year, a series of bilateral interactions illustrated Manila’s pivot towards Washington. In October 2022, a few months after the new president's inauguration, US Ambassador to the Philippines, MaryKay Carlson, announced $100 million to finance the Philippines's military modernization program. Furthermore, the recent visit of US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, to Manila in early February 2023 brought more agreements between the two countries. Both sides agreed to grant US troops increased access to an additional four Philippine bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). In addition, the US decided to allocate over $82 million towards infrastructure investments at EDCA's five existing sites. Representatives of both countries also announced the resumption of joint maritime patrols, initiated in March 2016, during the presidency of Benigno Aquino III, but which were suspended in October 2016 after Rodrigo Duterte took office.
To date, four air force bases (Basa Air Base, Antonio Bautista Air Base, Lumbia Airfield, Mactan–Benito Ebuen Air Base) and one of the Philippines’ main army bases (Fort Magsaysay) operate under the EDCA. Particularly noteworthy are Basa Air Base, from which air patrols are carried out near the Scarborough Shoal, as well as Antonio Bautista Air Base which plays a crucial role in conducting reconnaissance flights over the Spratly Islands. In turn, Fort Magsaysay plays a fundamental role in organizing the annual Balikatan bilateral maneuvers. Secretary Austin and his Filipino counterpart, Carlito Galvez Jr., did not specify which new locations would be included in the EDCA, arguing that decisions on this matter would be taken after consultations with local authorities in the Philippines. However, taking into account the scope of missions carried out under the EDCA, which include natural disaster relief, maritime security, and counterterrorism, as well as the characteristics of the five existing bases under the EDCA, it seems likely that navy and/or marine corps bases will be included among the four new military sites. In addition to the specificity of the new military bases, their location will take on equally or even more importance with, according to recent reports, representatives of the Philippines and the United States considering provinces such as Cagayan, Isabela, Palawan and Zambales. From the government's perspective in Manila and the disputes in the South China Sea, the Palawan province is of key importance because it is closest to the Spratly archipelago. The inclusion of the Oyster Bay Naval Base in the EDCA would also provide greater opportunities for the US to support the Philippine Navy in protecting its claims to the Spratly Islands from Chinese aggression. The situation would be analogous in the case of the Zambales province, located in the vicinity of the Scarborough Shoal, which is also the subject of a dispute between China and the Philippines. From Washington's point of view, it would be most beneficial to gain access to a military base in Cagayan province, which is located in the northeastern part of Luzon and approximately 200 miles off the southern coast of Taiwan. Greater access for American troops to Cagayan would increase the US military’s capabilities and speed of reaction in the event of hostile PRC actions against Taiwan.
A path to a new quadrilateral agreement - QUAD 2.0?
Shortly after reaching an agreement to expand the EDCA, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. paid a visit to Japan, during which the two parties discussed a Visiting Forces Agreement to facilitate more joint drills and arms transfers. Also on the table for discussion was a proposal to strengthen trilateral cooperation between the Philippines, Japan, and the United States. Although President Marcos made it clear that the issue of the trilateral alliance had not been discussed in detail, he confirmed the continuation of negotiations on this issue due to the growing threat in the region resulting from the escalation of geopolitical tensions. A few weeks after the visit of the US Secretary of Defense to the Philippines, it was the turn of Australia's Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles to visit the country. During a meeting with Philippine Defense Officer-in-Charge Senior Undersecretary, Carlito Galvez Jr., Marles presented a proposal to implement joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea. It is worth mentioning that, from a historical point of view, Australia is the second closest security partner of the Philippines after the United States. Over the past few decades, both countries have signed several key defense agreements, including a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperative Defense Activities, the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement, and the Australia-Philippine Comprehensive Partnership. In addition, Australia actively supports the Philippines in anti-terrorist activities and natural disaster relief, which is extremely important from an internal security perspective.
The intensification of interaction between these four countries, which was particularly visible throughout this February, contributed to conceptualizing a new four-party format with the Philippines at the center. This could be an alternative version of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) - QUAD 2.0, in which the Philippines would replace India. India's disappointing stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine would seem to favor this potential initiative. Not only did New Delhi not join Western sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector, but it even benefited from the conflict in Europe by importing cheaper Russian oil, thus undermining the credibility and cohesion of the QUAD. Another argument supporting the new quadrilateral agreement is the fact that the Philippines, the United States, Japan, and Australia are already working closely together in the sphere of security. Armed forces from four countries took part in last year's Kamandag exercises. Moreover, this year's Balikatan maneuvers are scheduled for April 10-28, in which approximately 17,600 troops comprising 12,000 American, 5,000 Filipino, and 111 Australian soldiers, will be joined by observers from Japan. Furthermore, everything indicates that the idea of a quadrilateral pact enjoys political support in in the Philippines. The deputy chair of the Philippine Senate foreign relations committee, Francis Tolentino argued in an interview published in "The Sydney Morning Herald" that such a format of cooperation would contribute to maintaining regional peace as well as security and could therefore effectively counteract China's assertive behavior in the region. The extended military cooperation of the four countries would lead to the enhancement of the US-led “integrated deterrence” strategy aimed at China in the Indo-Pacific region. However, further essential decisions still need to be made, such as the conclusion of the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, as well as the upgrading of bilateral relations between the Philippines and Australia to a strategic partnership. In both cases, talks are already underway, so it can be assumed that it is only a matter of time before decisions are made.
Will the Philippines be the next Ukraine?
According to the Russian narrative, the "special operation" in Ukraine was provoked by the expansion of NATO's influence in Eastern Europe, thus threatening the security of the Russian Federation. Based on the recent decisions of Manila, aimed at tightening the Philippines’ defense cooperation with the United States and its allies including Japan and Australia, there has been speculation in the Philippine media about the possibility of repeating the European scenario with a similar reaction from China towards the Philippines. The Chinese Embassy in Manila has criticized plans to open up additional sites under the EDCA, showing that Beijing sees expanding US military access to Philippine military bases as a threat to its interests in the region. The sister of the president of the Philippines, Senate foreign relations committee chairperson Imee Marcos, also expressed her concerns about a tightening of the country’s alliance with the United States. At a Senate briefing on the new EDCA sites, Imee Marcos pointed out that establishing any new sites in Northern Luzon would be a provocation to China as it is the closest Philippines’ region to Taiwan. She also indicated that the new EDCA locations should be in the western, not the northern part of the country, in order to increase the capabilities of securing the nation's territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. Although the exact locations of the new sites under the EDCA are not yet known, this case shows that some Filipino politicians are wary of Chinese repercussions.
Considering the Chinese-Philippine trade relations, it can be unequivocally stated that Beijing has strong economic tools to pressure the Philippines, as it is the country's main trading partner. In addition, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. undertook to continue his predecessor’s plans that were focused on the state's infrastructural development, which would be much more challenging to implement without China's financial and technological support. After all, it was one of the main reasons for President Marcos' visit to China in early January of this year.
In addition to the economic aspects, the continuing presence of the Chinese navy, coast guard and maritime militia in the disputed areas of the South China Sea, claimed by the Philippines, is also noteworthy. In early March, the Philippine Coast Guard reported the presence of 42 maritime militia vessels around Thitu Island together with a Navy and Coast Guard vessel patrolling the island, which lies 300 miles off the western coast of Palawan province. The island is strategically important to the Philippines' position in the South China Sea dispute. In this context, it is worth paying attention to the comment of the American analyst from the RAND Corporation, Derek J. Grossman. In his view, while the vast majority of observers speculate about potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan, an attempt by the PRC to take over Thitu Island is much more likely. This could also trigger possible repercussions from China if the government in Beijing decides that the strengthening of the Philippine-American alliance has gone too far and directly threatens China's core interests.
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The strategic location of the Philippines makes closer military cooperation necessary from the perspective of Washington and China’s potential threat to Taiwan. As such, the Philippines will play a vital role in the US’ deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. It is worth noting here, however, that the policy of the Philippines towards China and the United States has changed on numerous occasions. An apparent tightening of relations with Washington after Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took office does not mean that such a policy will be continued throughout his presidency. Some adjustments even took place during the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte. At the same time, the signals sent by Imee Marcos show that the Marcos family is divided on the direction of the country's foreign policy.
Taking all of these factors into account, the vision of formalizing four-party cooperation similar to the QUAD format seems unlikely. The establishment of another minilateral format in the region would provide Beijing with further arguments to justify its narrative of an attempt to establish an “Asian NATO” aimed at checking and countering China. Taking such steps would certainly present the most risk to the government in Manila, which would have to reckon with severe economic repercussions and the likely intensification of Chinese activities in the disputed areas of the South China Sea. In addition, the participation of the Philippines in this endeavor would be contrary to the mindset adopted by the Southeast Asian states, which is based on not taking a particular superpower’s side. A much better solution for the Philippines would be to develop bilateral relations with the United States and its allies while improving interoperability skills through various exercises, such as the Balikatan. In this way, all four countries could effectively carry out joint military operations in the event of a threat but would avoid possible repercussions from the establishment of another minilateral format.